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CUTTING CYBERSTALKING’S GORDIAN KNOT: A SIMPLE
AND UNIFIED STATUTORY APPROACH
*

Casey O’Connor

I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet and other telecommunications technologies
are promoting advances in virtually every aspect of society
and every corner of the globe: fostering commerce,
improving education and health care, promoting
participatory democracy in the United States and abroad,
and facilitating communications among family and friends,
whether across the street or around the world.
Unfortunately, many of the attributes of this technology—
low cost, ease of use, and anonymous nature, among
others—make it an attractive medium for fraudulent scams,
child sexual exploitation, and increasingly, a new concern
1
known as “cyberstalking.”
These words, written more than a decade ago, described the
emerging difficulty of keeping apace with technology in a rapidly
changing world. With the explosion of social media and expansion
in online capabilities forming new means through which
cyberstalkers accomplish their malicious ends, these concerns
resonate no less strongly today. Although the law has attempted to
keep up, the current system creates dueling obligations and
confusions that often obscure justice.
2
Consider the case of Jake Baker and Arthur Gonda. The two
men were online acquaintances who exchanged e-mails that
3
expressed their mutual “sexual interest in violence against women.”
Their often-explicit communications detailed their intention to
*
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laude, 2009, Rutgers University. The author thanks Professor Kip Cornwell for his
guidance.
1
1999 REPORT ON CYBERSTALKING: A NEW CHALLENGE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
INDUSTRY: A REPORT FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO THE VICE PRESIDENT (Aug. 1999),
available at http://www.cyber-rights.org/documents/cyberstalkingreport.htm.
2
United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997).
3
Id. at 1493.
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convert their interest into action. For example, “Wiat [sic] until late
at night. grab [sic] her when she goes to unlock the door. Knock
her unconscious. and [sic] put her into one of those portable lockers
(forget the word for it). or [sic] even a duffle bag. Then hurry her
5
out to the car and take her away . . . What do you think?” Baker went
further, posting a story on an online forum that described “the
torture, rape, and murder of a young woman who shared the name of
6
one of Baker’s classmates at the University of Michigan.” When the
story was discovered, the duo was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c),
which prohibits sending a “communication containing any threat” to
7
kidnap or injure a person in interstate commerce. Despite the vile
nature of the communications and the apparent applicability of the
statute, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the
8
indictment. According to the court, for a communication to rise to
the level of “threat,” it must be “conveyed to effect some change or
9
achieve some goal through intimidation.” Because Baker and Gonda
neither sought change nor desired a particular goal, their terrifying
10
rhetoric went unpunished.
Cyberstalkers also use the Internet to facilitate their in-person
stalking, often bypassing steps in the “course of conduct” required by
11
many traditional stalking statutes, as in the case of Amy Lynn
12
Boyer. She was stalked and later murdered while leaving work by
13
Liam Youens, a man she did not know. This tragedy is notable
because Youens did not obtain Boyer’s work address as stalkers
14
normally do. Instead, he purchased the information, as well as her
4

Id.
Id. at 1500 (Krupansky, J., dissenting).
6
Id. at 1493 (majority opinion).
7
Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012).
8
Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1496.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
New Hampshire’s stalking statute, for instance, prohibits a person from
engaging in a “course of conduct targeted at a specific person which would cause a
reasonable person to fear for his or her personal safety.” N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
633:3-a (2013). The statute enumerates certain behavior included in a “course of
conduct,” like “[f]ollowing, approaching, or confronting . . . [or] [a]ppearing in
close proximity to [the person].” Id. Notably absent are non-physical methods of
information gathering.
12
Chris Wright, Murder.com: What Happened Last Fall on This Tiny New Hampshire
Street Triggered a National Debate on Internet Crime. But was the Web Really to Blame for the
Death of Amy Boyer?, THE BOS. PHOENIX, Aug. 10, 2000, available at
http://www.bostonphoenix.com/archive/features/00/08/10/MURDER.html.
13
Id. After murdering Boyer, Youens turned his gun on himself. Id.
14
Id.
5
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social security number, from an online data broker called
15
As Youens himself acknowledged, “[i]t’s actually
Docusearch.
16
obscene what you can find out about a person on the internet.”
Even newer technologies have provided individuals different
17
means with which to harass. Offensive communications on social
networking websites like Facebook and Twitter present traditional
First Amendment issues in unique contexts. In a recent example,
William Cassidy allegedly posted hundreds of threatening Twitter
18
messages, almost all aimed at American Buddhist figure Alyce Zeoli.
Cassidy argued that a conviction would impinge upon his First
19
Amendment rights, and the District Court of Maryland agreed. In
defense of its position, the court analogized Twitter to colonial-era
bulletin boards, leaving itself vulnerable to the criticism that its
20
understanding of the medium lacks nuance. Clearly, the courts are
still grappling with the proper characterization of these websites and
the nature of their communications, a difficulty that underscores the
challenges inherent in creating viable statutory mechanisms for
punishing cyberstalking.
21
“Cyberstalking by proxy” further complicates the picture, as the
22
recent Craigslist rape case demonstrates.
Jebidiah James Stipe
created a false Craigslist posting in his ex-girlfriend’s name in which
23
he claimed that she had a rape fantasy. Another man, Ty Oliver
MacDowell, believing the ad to be legitimate, went to her house and
24
raped her at gunpoint. Stipe was indeed punished, but not under
25
any cyberstalking laws. Although this type of conduct seems like
15

Id.
Id.
17
See, e.g., Caroline Black, Ex-Marine Jebidiah James Stipe Gets 60 Years for Craigslist
Rape Plot, CBS NEWS (June 29, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_16220009162-504083.html; Somini Sengupta, Case of 8,000 Menacing Posts Tests Limits of
Twitter Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011
/08/27/technology/man-accused-of-stalking-via-twitter-claims-free-speech.html; Bob
Sullivan, Vengeful Online Sex Ads Take Growing Toll, THE REDTAPE CHRONICLES (July 27,
2010), http://redtape.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2010/07/27/6345571-vengeful
-online-sex-ads-take-growing-toll.
18
Sengupta, supra note 17.
19
United States v. Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574 (D. Md. 2011); see infra text
accompanying notes 189–202.
20
Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 576; see infra text accompanying notes 189–202.
21
Sullivan, supra note 17.
22
Black, supra note 17.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Stipe pleaded guilty to sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated
burglary, and will serve a sixty-year prison sentence. Id.
16
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exactly the type of harm that cyberstalking statutes should address,
the current cyberstalking statutory regime is inadequate because both
state and federal laws require the perpetrator to contact the victim
26
directly.
Some commentators have called for amendments to
27
address this shortcoming.
The foregoing illustrates the insufficiency of the criminal law as
presently constituted to address cyberstalking. While state and
federal statutes exist, they often fail to criminalize conduct whose
harms are self-evident, as in the cases above. When the statutes do
cover such conduct, they do so in divergent ways. The resultant web
of statutory prohibitions creates an incoherent system that does more
harm than good.
This Comment argues that a unified federal approach is needed
to remedy the problem and successfully control cyberstalking. Part II
addresses the current state-by-state approach, arguing that it is both
deficient from a policy perspective and violative of the Dormant
Commerce Clause. Part III turns to the three federal statutes
currently applied to quell cyberstalking, highlighting their own
unique problems. Part IV advocates one federal law, drafted broadly
enough to encompass the increasingly broad array of cyberstalking
activities. More specifically, Part IV proposes that the federal
government’s primary cyberstalking statute be amended to remove
unnecessary procedural roadblocks, to expand the bases for
prosecution, to standardize the government’s approach to
cyberstalking, and to provide federal recourse for the victims of
cyberstalking. By adopting these proposals, the federal government
will begin repairing the significant inadequacies of the present
system.
II. A STATE-BY-STATE APPROACH TO CYBERSTALKING LEGISLATION IS
INAPPROPRIATE
It is undeniable that when we use the Internet, we do so without
28
an appreciation of what state we are in.
The Internet is an
incorporeal space, devoid of artificial boundaries and topographical
29
landmarks. As the District Court for the Southern District of New
26

See Naomi Harlin Goodno, Cyberstalking, A New Crime: Evaluating the Effectiveness
of Current State and Federal Laws, 72 MO. L. REV. 125, 152 (2007); see infra text
accompanying notes 45–56, 214–216, 230–236.
27
Goodno, supra note 26; see infra text accompanying notes 230–236.
28
See American Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
29
See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 837 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (the Internet is a
“single body of knowledge”).
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York noted in American Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, “geography . . . is a
30
virtually meaningless construct on the Internet.” Given this reality,
laws addressing conduct on the Internet should reflect the notion
that state boundaries have no meaning on the Internet and that
individuals are likely unaware of the variations between states’ laws,
or even, perhaps, in what state their Internet conduct is taking
31
place.
Nevertheless, states have enacted and modified a broad array of
32
statutes that address cyberstalking.
These statutes fall into three
33
general categories: (1) cyberstalking-specific laws; (2) general
34
stalking laws that have been amended to cover cyberstalking; and
35
(3) non-stalking laws applied to like conduct. What follows is a brief
survey of current state approaches to cyberstalking, through which a
few things should become clear. The first is that states often have
clever and efficient ways of drafting their statutes. Their methods
vary widely, however, and while certain elements of these statutes are
commendable, the resulting inconsistency creates confusion and
competing obligations for the Internet user. Within the unique
framework of the Internet landscape, this result should be
36
impermissible. And as will be explained further below, these laws—
for many of the same reasons—also violate the Dormant Commerce
Clause.

30

Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 169.
See id.
32
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 11.41.260, 11.41.270 (West 2006); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 5-41-108 (West 2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048 (West 2011); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 602 (2010); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/12-7.5 (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 106.5
(2008); 13 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1027 (2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-506 (1977).
33
See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/12-7.5.
34
See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-506.
35
See, e.g., 13 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1027.
36
Indeed, courts and commentators alike have long recognized the desirability
of uniformity between the states in a wide variety of contexts. See generally Perfect 10,
Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting the inconsistency
between states’ intellectual property laws, and concluding that allowing state laws to
regulate Internet-based intellectual property would “be contrary to Congress’s
expressed goal of insulating the development of the Internet from the various statelaw regimes[]”); Kenneth W. Swenson, A Stitch in Time: The Continental Shelf,
Environmental Ethics, and Federalism, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 851, 882 (1987) (noting the
need for uniform legislation in the context of environmental regulation); Wendy
Trahan, The Future of Sales and Use Tax on Electronic Commerce: Promoting Uniformity After
Quill, 21 VA. TAX REV. 101, 117–18 (2001) (“Uniform sales and use tax legislation may
reduce the burden on electronic commerce businesses that are subject to varying
state and local government collection obligations.”)..
31
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A. State Law Inconsistencies
Illinois is one of a few states that has passed a cyberstalkingspecific statute. Its expansive law makes a first cyberstalking
37
conviction a Class 4 felony.
The law provides that someone
“commits cyberstalking when he or she engages in a course of
conduct using electronic communication directed at a specific
person, and he or she knows or should know that would cause a
reasonable person to” either “fear for his or her safety or the safety of
38
a third person” or “suffer other emotional distress.” A person also
commits cyberstalking “when he or she, knowingly and without lawful
justification, on at least 2 separate occasions, harasses another
person”—or solicits his or her harassment—through the use of
electronic communication by transmitting a threat that places a
“person in reasonable apprehension of immediate or future bodily
39
harm.”
Although these two provisions are fairly standard, the legislature
also included language unique to other cyberstalking laws.
Specifically, the law also punishes one who “creates and maintains an
Internet website or webpage” that harasses a person, communicates a
40
threat, or solicits an act that would violate the provision.
This
subsection is important because it seemingly applies to the conduct
of William Lawrence Cassidy, who, as mentioned above, was accused
of posting threatening Twitter messages about Buddhist leader Alyce
41
Zeoli. Furthermore, the provision appears to reach the conduct of
defendants Baker and Gonda in Alkhabaz, whose indictments under a
federal statute were dismissed, the court finding that their conduct,
though “sadistic,” did not amount to “communication containing a
42
threat.”
Whether Illinois’s statute would address either the online
43
information gathering of Liam Youens or the “cyberstalking by
44
proxy” of Jebidiah James Stipe, however, is an open question, devoid
of guiding case law. The statute would most likely not apply to

37

720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/12-7.5.
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Sengupta, supra note 17.
42
United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1497–98 (6th Cir. 1997).
federal statue under which the
defendants were charged was 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012).
43
Wright, supra note 12.
44
Black, supra note 17.
38

The
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Youens because of the “directed at a specific person” requirement.
Although Youens did undergo a “course of conduct” directed at
Boyer, it would be difficult to argue that the statutorily imperative
portion of that course of conduct that occurred online was directed
at her. The statute’s applicability to Stipe’s conduct is a closer call.
While no provision within the statute fits his conduct directly, a court
could interpret each of the three to cover “cyberstalking by proxy.”
45
Mississippi’s cyberstalking law contains four provisions, and
46
differs from Illinois’s in certain respects. Under this statute, it is
unlawful for a person to use in electronic communication “any words
47
Second, it is
or language threatening to inflict bodily harm.”
unlawful to repeatedly contact another person electronically “for the
48
purpose of threatening, terrifying or harassing” that person. The
conduct prohibited by this provision would likely not be punishable
by Illinois’s cyberstalking law, though the ultimate determination
would depend on the content of the messages. Third, it is unlawful
to make false statements “concerning death, injury, illness,
disfigurement, indecent conduct, or criminal conduct” about a
49
person or his family “with the intent to threaten, terrify or harass.”
Finally, it is unlawful to “[k]nowingly permit an electronic
communication device under the person’s control to be used for any
50
purpose prohibited by this section.”
Although, again, the courts have been silent on the statute’s
application, the statute’s language suggests that it fails to address all
51
but the most conventional cyberstalking behavior. For instance, its
52
provisions require the offender to contact the victim directly;
therefore, the statute will not attach to the online postings of Jake
53
Baker and Arthur Gonda, the online information gathering of Liam
54
Youens, the malicious Twitter postings of William Lawrence
55
56
Cassidy, or the “cyberstalking by proxy” of Jebidiah James Stipe.
Interestingly, North Carolina’s cyberstalking statute mirrors
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-45-15 (West 2003).
Compare id., with 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/12-7.5 (2011).
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-45-15.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1496 (6th Cir. 1997).
Wright, supra note 12.
Sengupta, supra note 17.
Black, supra note 17.
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57

Mississippi’s statute nearly word for word.
In fact, the only
differences that can be found with respect to the prohibited conduct
rest in the mens rea requirements of the second and third
58
provisions.
Where in Mississippi the conduct is unlawful if it is
59
committed with the intent to threaten, terrify, or harass, the same
conduct is unlawful in North Carolina if it is committed with the
60
intent to “abuse, annoy, threaten, terrify, harass, or embarrass.”
Neither legislature explains the difference in mens rea, but North
Carolina’s mens rea requirements reflect those in its pre-existing
61
telephone harassment statute, suggesting that the matter is more
one of statutory continuity than one of legislative precision.
A more significant discrepancy between the two states’ statutes,
however, resides in the their respective punishments. In Mississippi,
cyberstalking is a felony offense punishable by up to five years for a
repeat offense; in North Carolina, on the other hand, cyberstalking is
merely a Class 2 misdemeanor, with a maximum prison sentence of
62
sixty days. As a result, individuals found guilty of exactly the same
conduct face the prospect of very different punishments depending
on the location of the offense. It is this very type of disparity that
renders the state statutory system so problematic.
Another approach that states take is to amend traditional
63
stalking statutes to encompass cyberstalking behavior. Wyoming’s
astutely composed stalking statute punishes someone who, with the
intent to harass,
engages in a course of conduct reasonably likely to harass
that person, including but not limited to any combination
of the following: (i) [c]ommunicating, anonymously or
otherwise, or causing a communication with another person
by verbal [or] electronic . . . means in a manner that
57

Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-196.3 (West 2000), with MISS. CODE. ANN. §
97-45-15.
58
Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-196.3, with MISS. CODE. ANN. § 97-45-15.
59
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-45-15.
60
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-196.3 (emphasis added).
61
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-196 (West 2000).
62
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-45-15 provides that cyberstalking is a “felony punishable
by imprisonment for not more than two (2) years.” If the communication contains a
“credible threat,” however, or if the offense is a repeat offense, then it is “punishable
by imprisonment for no more than five (5) years. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-45-15. In
North Carolina, on the other hand, a class 2 misdemeanor carries a maximum prison
sentence—even if the individual has committed five prior offenses—of sixty days in
prison. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-1340.23 (West 1995).
63
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 11.41.260, 11.41.270 (West 2006); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 6-2-506 (1977).
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harasses; (ii) [f]ollowing a person . . . ; (iii) [p]lacing a
person under surveillance . . . ; (iv) [o]therwise engaging in
64
a course of conduct that harasses another person.
The Wyoming legislature recognized that, today, stalking takes place
both online and off, and that an appropriate legislative response
should allow the punishable course of conduct to remain similarly
65
fluid. In recognition of this principle, the statute punishes acts that
take place either online or in person, severing the distinction
between traditional stalking and cyberstalking. Because of this,
Wyoming’s statute is the only law in this brief survey that would likely
66
punish Liam Youens’s covert online surveillance.
Moreover, its
67
scope is broad enough that it might attach to Cassidy’s Twitter rants
68
In Wyoming, stalking is a
and Stipe’s “cyberstalking by proxy.”
69
misdemeanor.
A final group of state statutes attempt to address cyberstalking
without utilizing either cyberstalking or traditional stalking
70
language. For example, Vermont’s most closely applicable statute
makes it a crime to, “with intent to terrify, intimidate, threaten, harass
or annoy,” make contact with another and
(i) make[] any request, suggestion or proposal which is
obscene, lewd, lascivious or indecent; (ii) threaten[] to
inflict injury or physical harm to the person or property of
any person; or (iii) disturb[], or attempt[] to disturb, by
repeated anonymous telephone calls or other electronic
71
communications, whether or not conversation ensues[.]
Despite the absence of specific stalking or cyberstalking
72
terminology, the statute’s language reflects that of many other
64

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-506(b) (1977).
Id.
66
Wright, supra note 12.
67
Sengupta, supra note 17.
68
Black, supra note 17.
69
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-506 (1977).
70
See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2–60 (2002).
71
13 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1027.
72
Vermont’s law does, however, contain an interesting jurisdictional provision.
“An offense committed . . . as set forth in this section shall be considered to have
been committed at either the place where the telephone call or calls originated or at
the place where the communication or communications or calls were received.” Id.
This language is strange, because, according to a plain reading of the provision,
when the crime’s setting is based on the “origination,” rather than the “receipt,” of a
message, only a telephone call may form the basis of jurisdiction. If the message was
created on a computer, the only place where a crime may be committed is where the
message was received. Though no findings state so explicitly, this discrepancy may
be an attempt to avoid the problem of states prosecuting out-of-state residents who
65
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states, and would probably apply both to Cassidy’s Twitter
73
74
harassment and to Stipe’s “cyberstalking by proxy.” It would likely
75
76
not, however, punish Jake Baker, Arthur Gonda, or Liam Youens,
77
because it requires the individual to make contact with the victim.
Given the statute’s similarity to those of other states, it is perhaps
strange that a conviction under this statute exposes the defendant to
a maximum punishment of only three months of imprisonment and
78
a fine of $250.00 —a true disparity when viewed in light of other
79
states’ responses.
This brief survey of state cyberstalking statutes demonstrates that
states have different opinions about the harms that cyberstalking
presents, and different approaches in addressing them. While these
laws contain valuable provisions that the federal government would
be wise to adopt, the significant overlap between them creates a web
of inconsistency that, as a public policy matter, should render them
80
unenforceable. The Internet landscape is too devoid of cognizable
boundaries to allow individual states to carve out wide prohibitions.
B. The State Approach Violates the Dormant Commerce Clause
Not only are the inconsistencies in the state-law approach
problematic from a public policy perspective, these inconsistencies
also render the state statutes violative of the Dormant Commerce
Clause. As a general matter, the Dormant Commerce Clause “is the
principle that state and local laws are unconstitutional if they place
81
an undue burden on interstate commerce.”
If a law does not
contact victims within the state. Then again, it is difficult to see why that rationale
would not extend to telephone communications as well as computer
communications.
73
Sengupta, supra note 17.
74
Black, supra note 17.
75
See United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997).
76
Wright, supra note 12.
77
13 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1027.
78
Id.
79
In Illinois, cyberstalking is a class 4 felony. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/12-7.5
(2011). Under Illinois law, a class 4 felony is punishable by a sentence of “not less
than one year and not more than three years.” 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-45
(2012). In Mississippi and North Carolina, as noted, the maximum sentences are five
years and sixty days, respectively. Supra note 6262. In Rhode Island, the sentence
can be as long as two years. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-52-4.2 (West 2008).
80
For a similar view on the “smorgasbord” of state cyberstalking law, see Harry A.
Valetk, Mastering the Dark Arts of Cyberspace: A Quest for Sound Internet Safety Policies,
2004 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2, 70–77 (2004).
81
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 419 (Vicki
Been et al. eds., 3d ed. 2006).
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discriminate against non-residents, then the court employs a
82
balancing test first articulated in Pike v. Brace Church, Inc. According
to this test, a facially nondiscriminatory law that regulates a legitimate
local interest and has only incidental effects on interstate commerce
“will be upheld unless the burden imposed upon such commerce is
83
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”
As commentators have noted, however, the Dormant Commerce
84
Clause “does not end with the Pike Test.” State laws may also be
struck down on the bases of “extraterritoriality” or “inconsistent
85
obligations.” The “extraterritoriality” doctrine was central to the
86
Supreme Court’s decision in Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc. At issue in Healy
was a Connecticut statute that required out-of-state beer shippers to
affirm that their prices were no higher than prices in the surrounding
87
states. The Court surveyed its extraterritoriality decisions, finding
that the Dormant Commerce Clause invalidated state laws that
88
regulated commerce taking place wholly outside of the state. In
such a case, it did not matter whether the statute’s “extraterritorial
89
reach was intended by the legislature.” More important were the
practical effects of the regulation and the statute’s potential
90
interaction with other states’ legitimate statutory regimes. Because
the affirmation statute had “the undeniable effect of controlling
commercial activity occurring wholly outside the boundary of the
91
State,” the Court invalidated it.
State laws may also violate the Dormant Commerce Clause in
92
another—and not entirely unrelated—way.
If a law has the
potential to “subject an area of interstate commerce to inconsistent
93
state regulation,” the Dormant Commerce Clause is violated. This
82

397 U.S. 137 (1970).
Id. at 142.
84
See, e.g., Chi Pann, Comment, The Dormant Commerce Clause and State Regulation
of the Internet: Are Laws Protecting Minors From Sexual Predators Different From Those
Protecting Minors From Sexually Explicit Materials?, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV., No. 8, at
5 (2005).
85
Id. at 5–6.
86
491 U.S. 324 (1989).
87
Id.
88
Id. at 336 (citing Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642–43 (1982)).
89
Id.
90
Id. at 336–37.
91
Id. at 337.
92
See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens of Port of Phila., 53 U.S. 299 (1851).
93
Pann, supra note 84, at 17 (citing Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S.
520, 529–30 (1959) (striking down a state highway regulation); S. Pac. Co. v. Sullivan,
325 U.S. 761, 779–82 (1945) (striking down a state railroad regulation)).
83
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principle has its roots in early Commerce Clause analysis. In Cooley,
the Court noted that “[w]hatever subjects of this power are in their
nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of
regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require
95
exclusive legislation by Congress.” The Court thus recognized that
some conduct, by its very nature, requires a uniform set of laws, only
96
appropriately provided by Congress.
Of the three tests, the Pike test is the most clearly defined, and is
97
generally accepted amongst commentators. Beyond that, however,
disputes arise. Some persuasively argue that the extraterritoriality
and inconsistent obligations bases are merely considerations under
98
the Pike test. Meanwhile, others maintain that those tests are distinct
from the Pike test, and are independently sufficient to invalidate state
99
laws. A third contingent reads the jurisprudence as endorsing two
100
of the above three tests. Despite the confusion, these tests clearly
inform modern Dormant Commerce Clause analysis, and all three
have been used to evaluate state laws that regulate Internet use, most
101
notably in American Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki.
Because the statute at
102
issue in Pataki resembles the cyberstalking statutes at issue here, the
Pataki decision serves as an important touchstone for the Dormant
Commerce Clause analysis of state cyberstalking laws.
94

See Cooley, 53 U.S. at 299.
Id. at 319.
96
Id.
97
Pann, supra note 84, at 18.
98
For instance, Goldsmith and Sykes present a compelling argument that the
“real concern underlying the extraterritoriality and inconsistent-regulations prongs
of dormant Commerce Clause analysis is not out-of-state effects and nonuniformity
per se, but rather whether the out-of-state burdens of a regulation outweigh its local
benefits.” Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 827 (2001).
99
Pann, supra note 84, at 18.
100
Michael W. Loudenslager, although acknowledging the three doctrines do at
least nominally exist in the jurisprudence, notes that courts have treated the
“inconsistent obligations” test “as effectively a preemption analysis.” Michael W.
Loudenslager, Allowing Another Policeman on the Information Superhighway: State Interests
and Federalism on the Internet in the Face of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 17 BYU J. PUB. L.
191, 230 (2003). Loudenslager recognizes the Pike balancing test and, relying heavily
on Healy, the extraterritoriality analysis as the two bases for invalidating
nondiscriminatory state laws under the Dormant Commerce Clause. Id. at 213–17.
Peter C. Felmy goes in a different direction, suggesting that the “extraterritoriality”
rationale be separated from Dormant Commerce Clause analysis altogether. Peter C.
Felmy, Beyond the Reach of the States: The Dormant Commerce Clause, Extraterritorial State
Legislation, and the Concerns of Federalism, 55 ME. L. REV. 467 (2003).
101
969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
102
See supra Part II.A.
95
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Pataki pitted a broad array of interest groups and organizations
103
against the Governor and the Attorney General of New York.
At
issue was the constitutionality of a New York law that made it a felony
to knowingly transmit to a minor, using a computer, material that is
104
harmful to minors.
The court concluded that the statute violated
the Dormant Commerce Clause on all three of the grounds detailed
above—the Pike balancing test, extraterritoriality, and inconsistent
105
obligations.
First, the court addressed the extraterritoriality defect of the
106
New York law.
The court noted that the “nature of the Internet
makes it impossible to restrict the effects of the New York Act to
107
conduct occurring within New York.”
Non-New Yorkers, in other
words, could not prevent their transmissions from entering New York.
This made them potentially subject to the New York statute’s
108
jurisdiction.
As a result, the statute had the practical effect of
109
regulating conduct wholly outside of the state. This encroachment,
the court held, rendered the New York Act “per se violative of the
110
[Dormant] Commerce Clause.”
111
Next, the court analyzed the law under the Pike balancing test.
While the court accepted that protecting children against pedophilia
was a legitimate state interest, it held that any benefit derived from
112
the law was outweighed by its burden on interstate commerce. For
one, the statute would not—indeed could not—have an effect on
113
international communications.
Further, the effective prosecution
of the statute would require pursuing out-of-staters, and that process
114
would be “beset with practical difficulties.” And because New York

103

These organizations included: American Library Association, Freedom to
Read Foundation, Inc., New York Library Association, Westchester Library System,
American Booksellers Foundation For Free Expression, Association of American
Publishers, Bibliobytes, Magazine Publishers of America, Interactive Digital Software
Association, Public Access Networks Corporation, ECHO, New York City Net, Art on
the Net, Peacefire, and the American Civil Liberties Union. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at
161–62.
104
Id. at 161–63. The law at issue was N.Y. Penal Law § 235.21.
105
Id. at 169; see Pann, supra note 84.
106
Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 173.
107
Id. at 177.
108
Pann, supra note 84, at 21.
109
Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 177.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 177–78.
113
Id. at 178.
114
Id.
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had other laws aimed at preventing similar harms, any benefits would
be confined to the narrow class of cases falling outside the scope of
115
The court balanced this relatively minor benefit
existing laws.
against the law’s significant burdens on interstate commerce,
including the “extreme burden” on interstate commerce, the
“chilling effect” on out of state Internet users, and the “excessive”
116
costs of enforcement. Because, on balance, the burdens of the law
on interstate commerce outweighed its local benefits, the law failed
117
the Pike test and violated the Dormant Commerce Clause.
Finally, the court decided that the statute was invalid because it
118
risked imposing upon individuals inconsistent obligations.
The
court, channeling Cooley, noted,
[t]he courts have long recognized that certain types of
commerce demand consistent treatment and are therefore
susceptible to regulation only on a national level. The
Internet represents one of those areas; effective regulation
will require national, and more likely global, cooperation.
Regulation by any single state can only result in chaos,
because at least some states will likely enact laws subjecting
119
Internet users to conflicting obligations.
As an illustration of the difficulties that would attend the upholding
of the law, the court referred to the legal standard upon which
120
conviction would turn.
The material sent must be “harmful to
minors,” which was defined, in part, as being “patently offensive to
121
prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole.”
The
problem with this standard is that “there is no single ‘prevailing
122
community standard’ in the United States.” Therefore, to avoid the
possibility of prosecution, the Internet user must either comply with
123
the most stringent regulation or forego communication entirely.
Because the risk of imposing inconsistent obligations is impermissible
under the Dormant Commerce Clause, the court struck down the
124
law.
In the wake of Pataki, other courts struck down similar laws,
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124

Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 179.
Pann, supra note 844, at 23 (citing Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 179–80).
Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 181.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 182.
Id.
Id.
Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 183.
Id.
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largely employing the same rationale as the Pataki court.
Not all
courts, however, were persuaded. The courts in the latter category—
overwhelmingly (and perhaps unsurprisingly) state courts—drew
distinctions between the statute at issue in Pataki and those at issue in
their cases, concluding that their statutes satisfied the Dormant
126
Commerce Clause.
Representative of those cases is a California decision, Hatch v.
127
Superior Court.
Hatch involved a statute similar to that in Pataki,
making it “a criminal offense to send, by any means, specified harmful
matter to a minor ‘with the intent or for the purpose of seducing a
128
minor.’”
Despite the similarities to the statute in Pataki, the
129
California law survived its Dormant Commerce Clause challenge.
The court distinguished Pataki on two grounds. First, the court
focused on the “intent-to-seduce” requirement. In the court’s view,
a ban on communication of specified matter to a minor for
purposes of seduction can only affect the rights of the very
narrow class of adults who intend to engage in sex with
minors. We have found no case which gives such intentions
or the communications employed in realizing them
130
protection under the dormant Commerce Clause.
In other words, because the commerce in question was not legal
under the laws of California, the Dormant Commerce Clause should
131
not apply.
Second, the court held that the statute would not likely affect
interstate commerce, citing California penal statutes that prevent
132
punishment for wholly extraterritorial offenses.
The court thus
133
upheld the statute.
134
Hatch and similar cases, however, were wrongly decided. The
distinctions the Hatch court drew from the statute in Pataki are, under
125

See PSINet, Inc. v. Chapman, 362 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 2004); Am. Booksellers
Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2003); ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149 (10th
Cir. 1999); Cyberspace Commc’ns, Inc. v. Engler, 142 F. Supp. 2d 827 (E.D. Mich.
2001).
126
See People v. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); Hatch v. Sup. Ct.,
94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404 (Wash. 2001).
127
94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453.
128
Id. at 459 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 288.2(a) (West 2012)).
129
Id.
130
Id. at 472.
131
See id.
132
Id. at 473.
133
Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473. The Hsu court utilized this same argument as
well. People v. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 191–92 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
134
See, e.g., Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184; State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404 (Wash. 2001).
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scrutiny, untenable. The Hatch court’s first error was the weight that
it afforded the statute’s mens rea requirement. The reason that the
intent element was important, it declared, was because it narrowed
the range of banned conduct—it would, in the court’s words, “only
affect the rights of the very narrow class of adults who intend to
135
Echoing that sentiment, California’s
engage in sex with minors.”
Fifth District Court of Appeal noted, in a similar case, People v. Hsu,
that “it is difficult to conceive of any legitimate commerce that would be
burdened by penalizing the transmission of harmful sexual material
136
known to minors in order to seduce them.” These courts erred in
their failure to recognize that the legitimacy or illegitimacy—that is,
the legality or illegality—of commerce is itself a legal conclusion,
dependent upon the particular law that a court is referencing.
For example, consider the statute at issue in Hatch and Hsu,
which prohibited sending harmful material to a minor “with the
137
intent or for the purpose of seducing a minor.” Because states have
different ages of consent, an adult in one state could be seducing
someone online whom he legitimately believes to be of age in his
state. In his own state, he would not be committing a crime, because
the object of his seduction, by his own state’s law, would not be a
minor. But because his target happens to reside in California—a fact
he may have no way of knowing—he would be subject to prosecution
in California. Because, in these cases the legitimacy of commerce
depends upon standards particular to state law, the commerce’s
legitimacy or illegitimacy will vary from state to state. Therefore, the
courts’ reliance on mens rea was an ineffective distinction from the
result in Pataki.
The Hatch court’s second error was its reliance on California’s
138
general bar on “punishment for wholly extraterritorial offenses” as
an indication that California would not pursue out-of-state offenders
for these types of crimes. As Alex McDonald notes, California courts
have repeatedly upheld convictions of individuals for crimes whose
results occurred in California, but whose conduct took place wholly
139
outside of California. An even more recent example confirms this
135

Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471.
Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 190 (emphasis added). Hsu involved the same statute
that was at issue in Hatch. Compare id. at 192, with Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 463.
137
CAL. PENAL CODE § 288.2(a) (West 2012).
138
Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473.
139
Alex C. McDonald, Dissemination of Harmful Matter to Minors Over the Internet, 12
SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 163 (2001). As McDonald notes:
In Ex Parte Hedley [31 Cal. 108 (1866)], the California Supreme Court
upheld the embezzlement conviction in California under California
136

O’CONNOR (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

5/28/2013 1:46 PM

COMMENT

1023

point. In People v. Betts, the Supreme Court of California held that “a
state may exercise jurisdiction over criminal acts that take place
outside of the state if the results of the crime are intended to, and do,
140
cause harm within the state.” So even though it might be true that
California will not pursue out-of-state offenders for wholly
extraterritorial crimes, it is equally true that the conduct at issue in
Hatch and Hsu was not wholly extraterritorial, because its results took
141
place within the state.
Moreover, even if it may be true that “there is no reason to
suppose California would attempt to impose its policies on other
142
states,” statutes that regulate extraterritorially are “invalid regardless
of whether the statute’s extraterritorial reach was intended by the
143
legislature.”
Furthermore, the statute must be considered in light
of “what effect would arise if not one, but many or every, State
144
adopted similar legislation.” While it might be true that California
would not pursue out-of-state offenders, as a logical matter, if at least
one state permits prosecution of out-of-state conduct, then the entire
Internet community is subject to inconsistent obligations. The user
will have to abide by the laws of his state as well as the laws of the state
that extends its reach beyond its geographical boundaries.
Therefore, under Healy, even if California truly did not intend to
145
assert its extraterritorial reach, the statute would still be invalid.
As a result of the weaknesses in the Hatch line of cases, Pataki
law of the defendant, who in Nevada drew checks on his employer’s
account and sent them to California to be cashed. In People v. Sansom
[37 Cal. App. 435 (C.A. Sec. Dis. Cal. 1918)], the California court
upheld the forgery (uttering) conviction in California under California
law of the defendant, who forged a check in Mexico and sent it to his
agent in California for deposit in an Arizona bank. Receipt in
California of an Internet communication sent from another state seems
indistinguishable from receipt in California of a forged check sent
from another state. It therefore appears that California criminal
jurisdiction permits prosecution in California under section 288.2(b)
California Penal Code of a person who sends an Internet
communication from another state that is received in California, and
otherwise satisfies the elements of the statute.
Id. at 213–14.
140
People v. Betts, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 138, 142 (Cal. 2005).
141
See Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453; Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184.
142
Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473.
143
Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989). The Hsu court betrays its
ignorance of this critical point by noting that the statute “makes no reference to
place of performance, so courts must assume the Legislature did not intend to
regulate conduct taking place outside the state.” Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 192.
144
Healy, 491 U.S. at 336.
145
Id. at 336.
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emerges as the more persuasive authority both from a legal and
public policy perspective. The principles that drove the decision in
Pataki are highly relevant to the legitimacy of the state statutory
approach to cyberstalking. Consider, for example, a hypothetical
Dormant Commerce Clause analysis of the Illinois cyberstalking
146
statute, applying the principles at work in Pataki.
C. A Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis of Illinois’s Cyberstalking
Statute
First, we must consider the extraterritoriality doctrine. Under
Healy, a statute “that directly controls commerce occurring wholly
outside the boundaries of a State” is invalid under the Dormant
147
Commerce Clause.
If the practical effect of the law is to control
conduct in other states, it is invalid, regardless of the legislature’s
148
intent.
Illinois’s law contains no geographic limitation; its
provisions apply to all electronic communication, without reference
149
to where the sender physically resides.
Under a plain reading of
the law, an individual outside of Illinois could initiate online contact
with an individual in Illinois and violate any of the three provisions of
the law, subjecting himself to prosecution in Illinois. Perhaps the
150
Illinois law’s final provision draws this into clearest relief: a person
who creates a webpage about another person does not directly
communicate with his victim; rather, he displays his message to the
Internet community at large, in whatever state the recipient may
reside. Because the website’s creator does not have control over
where his website is accessible, he must either comply with Illinois’s
unique law or forgo his communication entirely. This is precisely the
choice to which the extraterritoriality doctrine is directed, and as a
result the Illinois statute violates the Dormant Commerce Clause.
If the Pataki court’s application of the Pike test is accepted, it will
also doom Illinois’s statute. As mentioned, the Pike test involves a
151
two-step inquiry.
First, the court must examine the legitimacy of
the state’s interest. It is difficult to contest the validity of the interest
here, and a court would most likely assume its validity. Next, the
court must determine whether the burden to interstate commerce

146
147
148
149
150
151

Recall Illinois’s cyberstalking-specific statute. Supra Part II.A.
Healy, 491 U.S. at 336.
Id.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/12-7.5 (2011).
See supra text accompanying notes 37–40.
Pike v. Brace Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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152

outweighs the state’s interest.
It was at this point that the Pataki
court balked, and the court’s arguments resonate in this context as
well. First, the “practical difficulties” involved with enforcement of
the statute reduce the significance of the local benefit—for example,
Illinois could not prevent online harassment from international
153
It also might be cost prohibitive to prosecute individuals
sources.
154
whose only contact with the state “occurs via the Internet.”
Furthermore, the “chilling effect” discussed in Pataki is also present
here, and “Internet users will steer clear of the Act by significant
155
margin,” thereby burdening interstate commerce.
For these
reasons, the Illinois law would probably be invalidated under the Pike
test as well.
Finally, the Illinois statute violates the Dormant Commerce
Clause on the basis of the inconsistent obligations it imposes on
Internet users. Every state espouses different values, and these values
are inevitably reflected in the state’s legal code. Illinois’s statute—
156
and in particular subsection (a)(5)—is unique.
It is not an
unreasonable provision, but at this point, Illinois is the only state to
157
employ such language.
In every other state—assuming the
language in other states’ statutes will not be stretched beyond
cognizance—such conduct is legal. But an Internet user creating or
maintaining such an Internet site in any other state must be aware
not only of the laws of his own state, but also of this Illinois law.
These are precisely the inconsistent obligations that violate the
158
Dormant Commerce Clause.
This Comment does not argue that the state statutes are, by and
large, poorly drafted, or that they are wrongheaded responses to the
social ills wrought by cyberstalking. Instead, this Comment argues
that a state-by-state approach to cyberstalking reflects poor public
policy and violates the Dormant Commerce Clause. These laws reach
beyond their states’ boundaries, they impose inconsistent obligations
upon Internet users, and by and large they impose a greater burden
on interstate commerce than is justified by the harm they target. In

152

Id.
See Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
154
Id. at 178.
155
Id. at 179.
156
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/12-7.5 (2011).
157
See id.
158
Here we again witness the overlap between the extraterritoriality and
inconsistent obligations doctrines. While this overlap exposes the uncertainty of
current law, it does not undermine the legal conclusions derived from the doctrines.
153
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the “decentralized, global communications medium” that is the
Internet, these scattered laws are an incomplete and unsatisfying
solution. Because cyberstalking and the harms that it creates
routinely “travel” across state boundaries, sound jurisprudence and
public policy demonstrate that an appropriate response to
cyberstalking is a unified federal system. The ideal federal approach
will utilize the best parts of the state statutes—like Illinois’s creationor-maintenance-of-a-website provision and Wyoming’s implicit
recognition that much stalking activity today vacillates fluidly between
online and offline conduct—and simultaneously remedy the state-bystate approach’s significant shortcomings.
III. THE CURRENT FEDERAL APPROACH TO CYBERSTALKING IS LACKING
Today, three federal statutes apply to adult cyberstalking
160
161
One provision of one statute is directed specifically at
behavior.
cyberstalking; the others are slightly different statutes that courts have
162
adapted to cyberstalking as a matter of convenience. As a practical
matter, however, the cyberstalking statute and other applicable
statutes constitute an inefficient and substandard regime. The
following section describes the existing statutes and addresses their
respective deficiencies.
A. 18 U.S.C. § 2261A
This statute is the federal government’s primary vehicle for
combating stalking and cyberstalking. It contains two provisions, one
dedicated to each. Section (1) is a fairly broad physical stalking
163
statute. It serves its limited purpose well, but standing alone it is an
159

Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 164.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 875 (2006); 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2006).
Another statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2425, prohibits the transmission of certain information
to a minor with the “intent to entice, encourage, offer, or solicit any person to
engage in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal
offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 2425 (2006). While this statute certainly has value, it is aimed
at a different harm than the harm discussed in this Comment, and is outside of its
scope. For a discussion of the application of cyberstalking law to children, see
Kimberly Wingteung Seto, How Should Legislation Deal With Children as the Victims and
Perpetrators of Cyberstalking?, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 67 (2002).
161
18 U.S.C. § 2261A.
162
18 U.S.C. § 875; 47 U.S.C. § 223; 18 U.S.C. § 2425.
163
18 U.S.C. § 2261A(1).
Whoever . . . travels in interstate or foreign commerce . . . with the
intent to kill, injure, harass, or place under surveillance with intent to
kill, injure, harass, or intimidate another person, and in the course of,
or as a result of, such travel places that person in reasonable fear of the
death of, or serious bodily injury to, or causes substantial emotional
160
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insufficient tool to combat cyberstalking.
Section (2) is the federal government’s cyberstalking
164
provision. Given its importance, it is reproduced below, in full.
Whoever
(2) with the intent—
(A) to kill, injure, harass, or place under
surveillance with intent to kill, injure, harass, or
intimidate, or cause substantial emotional distress
to a person in another State or tribal jurisdiction
or within the special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction
of
the
United
States;
or
(B) to place a person in another State or tribal
jurisdiction, or within the special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction of the United States, in
reasonable fear of the death of, or serious bodily
injury to—
(i) that person;
(ii) a member of the immediate family (as
defined in section 115) of that person; or
(iii) a spouse or intimate partner of that
person;
uses the mail, any interactive computer service, or any
facility of interstate or foreign commerce to engage in
a course of conduct that causes substantial emotional
distress to that person or places that person in
reasonable fear of the death of, or serious bodily injury
to, any of the persons described in clauses (i) through
(iii) of subparagraph (B); shall be punished as
165
provided in section 2261(b) of this title.
For reasons explained below, this provision has been used
sparingly. But when the government has employed the statute, it has
proved effective. In United States v. Bowker, the victim, Tina Knight,
began receiving threatening and vulgar e-mails from several different
166
An initial FBI investigation of the
e-mail addresses.
communications revealed Erik Bowker as the sender, and Knight

distress to that person, a member of the immediate family (as defined
in section 115) of that person, or the spouse or intimate partner of that
person.
Id.
164
165
166

18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2).
Id.
372 F.3d 365, 371 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated, 543 U.S. 1182 (2005).
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167

procured a cease and desist order. Bowker, however, continued to
send threatening e-mails, phone calls, and letters both to Knight and
168
to her family, suggesting that he would use violence against her.
Furthermore, Bowker traveled from his residence in Ohio to Knight’s
in West Virginia to take photographs of her place of work and to steal
169
her mail.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit found that Bowker
“intended to instill in Knight a fear of death or serious bodily harm
through use of the mails and other facilities of interstate commerce,”
170
and that he was guilty under § 2261A(2).
In United States v. Rose, a California man, Richard Rose, was
171
accused of cyberstalking a Minnesota woman, Lois Fischer. The two
had met online while playing a card game, and a romance
172
blossomed.
They exchanged “cyber vows” and agreed to meet in
173
When the time
California, while Fischer was on a business trip.
174
came, however, Fischer got cold feet, and she refused to meet Rose.
Rose tracked her down to her hotel and called her on the
175
telephone. But when Fischer’s husband answered (Fischer had told
him she was widowed), Rose became enraged, and responded by
sending her a barrage of vulgar and threatening e-mails, including
176
death threats to Fischer’s children.
Rose also posted pictures of
Fischer’s children online, “along with their full names, address, and
177
telephone number, on web sites soliciting sexual activity.” Perhaps
178
unsurprisingly, Rose was convicted under § 2261A(2).
One recent case is also worthy of note. Shawn Memarian
179
pleaded guilty to cyberstalking under § 2261A(1) in early 2009.
Memarian had dated his victim—a Missouri, then Colorado,
180
resident—for approximately one month.
After the relationship
167

Id. at 372.
Id.
169
Id. at 373.
170
Id. at 388. Bowker was appealing his convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(1),
47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C), and 18 U.S.C. § 1708. Id. at 370, 388.
171
315 F.3d 956, 957 (8th Cir. 2003).
172
Id.
173
Id.
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
Rose, 315 F.3d at 957.
178
Id. at 956. Rose was also convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). Id.
179
United States v. Memarian, 371 Fed. Appx. 711, 711 (8th Cir. 2010).
180
News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, KC Man Sentenced for Cyberstalking:
False Website Ads Invited Strangers to Victim’s Home for Sexual Encounters (June
17, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/mow/news2009/memarian.sen
168
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ended, Memarian began a wide-ranging course of online
181
182
He sent her “more than 75 threatening e-mails.”
harassment.
Worse, Memarian, posing as his victim, created false personal ads
describing the victim as a “sex freak,” which he posted on MySpace
183
and Facebook.
In all, approximately thirty men responded to the
184
What is
ads, some showing up to the victim’s house at night.
notable about Memarian’s plea is that it might suggest that his latter
185
conduct—”cyberstalking by proxy” —falls within the reach of
§ 2261A(2). But given that there was no trial—and that Memarian’s
sending of seventy-five threatening e-mails alone would likely have
been sufficient to garner a conviction under § 2261A(2)—concluding
so may be premature.
Indeed, some commentators are convinced that § 2261A(2)
would not cover “cyberstalking by proxy,” like that of Jebidiah James
186
Stipe.
According to Naomi Harlin Goodno, for all the good
§ 2261A(2) does, it still fails to “squarely deal with situations where
the cyberstalker pretends to be the victim and encourages third
parties to innocently harass the victim, such as posting sexual
invitations on a message board in the name of the victim to dupe
187
third parties to respond.” Given the increasing prevalence of such
conduct, an effective federal statute should clearly encompass this
harm.
An even more recent case, mentioned previously, adds an
interesting twist to the general applicability and efficacy of § 2261A.
William Lawrence Cassidy was charged with cyberstalking under
section § 2261A(2)(A) for a series of Twitter and blog postings
188
directed at Buddhist figure Alyce Zeoli.
Under a series of aliases,
189
Cassidy unleashed a virulent barrage of messages directed at Zeoli.
These messages ranged from pointed religious criticism (“(A.Z.) is a
demonic force who tries to destroy Buddhism”) to sinister and thinly
190
veiled threats (“Rain tomorrow should cover the tracks”). In the
end, Cassidy published about 8,000 tweets, most directed towards
.htm.
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Sullivan, supra note 17.
Black, supra note 17.
Goodno, supra note 26, at 152.
United States v. Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574, 576 (D. Md. 2011).
Id.
Id. app. A.
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191

Zeoli.
In December 2011, the District Court for the District of
Maryland dismissed Cassidy’s indictment, holding that, as applied to
Cassidy, § 2261A(2)(A) was an unconstitutional infringement on his
192
First Amendment right to free speech. In reaching its conclusion,
the court relied on a few important propositions. First, the court
193
analogized Twitter to a colonial-era bulletin board. Like a bulletin
board, which can be ignored simply by not walking over to the board,
Twitter allows users to ignore messages they do not want to view by
either “blocking” or “unfollowing” the sender of the offending
194
messages.
According to the court, “[t]his is in sharp contrast to a
telephone call, letter or e-mail specifically addressed to and directed
at another person, and that difference . . . is fundamental to the First
195
Amendment analysis in this case.”
Specifically, this distinction
meant the difference between the presence and absence of an
196
important government interest.
The Fourth Circuit has held, for
instance, that in the context of a telephone harassment statute, the
197
government does have a “strong and legitimate” interest.
But
because a Twitter user may disregard the offensive messages, that
same government interest is not present.
The second critical aspect of the case was that Zeoli is a
prominent religious figure. Amici pointed out that Zeoli’s own
Twitter account has 17,221 followers, and she has produced
198
instructional videos that have been viewed over 143,000 times.
Because she is an “easily identifiable public figure that leads a
religious sect,” the statute implicated types of expression that the
199
Supreme Court has consistently attempted to protect.
While at first blush the decision in this case casts doubts upon
the continuing validity of § 2261A(2)(A), Cassidy will not be the last
word on this cyberstalking statute. For one, this as-applied holding is
readily distinguishable, as most stalking cases do not involve
191

Sengupta, supra note 17.
Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 583.
193
Id. at 576.
194
Id. at 577.
195
Id. at 578.
196
Id.
197
Id. at 585 (citing Thorne v. Bailey, 846 F.2d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1988)).
198
Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d. at 586 n.14. Indeed, one can watch her official
enthronement as Jetsunma Akhon Lhamo, the reincarnation of an important
Buddhist figure. ENTHRONEMENT OF JETSUNMA AKHON LHAMO, http://www.tara.org
/jetsunma-ahkon-lhamo/biography/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2012).
199
Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d. at 586.
192
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prominent religious figures. Secondly, and possibly more critically,
the court’s bulletin board analogy fails to withstand scrutiny.
Although the court’s description of Twitter was accurate, the court
glossed over the fact that Zeoli could not actually easily ignore
Cassidy’s messages. She did attempt to ignore his tweets, but each
time she blocked him, Cassidy created a new alias with which to
200
harass Zeoli.
In all, Cassidy employed thirteen different
201
usernames. Thus, while Cassidy’s speech was not quite as direct as a
telephone call or e-mail, it is difficult to limit Twitter messages to the
“public forum” designation, especially given the particular facts of the
case. Given the importance of the bulletin board analogy to the
court’s disposition, it is puzzling that it chose to ignore this seemingly
critical fact.
A final shortcoming of § 2261A(2) is its overly cautious reach.
The statute’s applicability is significantly narrowed by the
requirement that the offender and the victim be in different states.
This restriction appears designed to protect against a potential
Commerce Clause challenge, but it is an unnecessary restriction
because the use of the Internet alone is enough to satisfy the
202
Commerce Clause.
By including this limitation, Congress
effectively constrained prosecution to a small subset of potential
cases. The limitation, for instance, would preclude prosecution in a
case like Jebidiah James Stipe’s, if Stipe had been in the same state as
his victim. That Stipe’s cyberstalking conduct could go unpunished
merely by virtue of an invisible and meaningless state line approaches
the absurd. Furthermore, in light of the deficiencies in the state
approach, it becomes clearer still that a proper federal statute must
have the maximum possible breadth.

200

Kashmir Hill, You Have a Constitutional Right to Stalk and Harass People on
Twitter, FORBES, Dec. 16, 2011, available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill
/2011/12/16/you-have-a-constitutional-right-to-stalk-and-harass-people-on-twitter/.
201
Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 579 n.7.
202
See U.S. v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that the Internet is
an instrumentality of interstate commerce, and Congress has the Commerce Clause
power to regulate the transmission of child pornography even if transmission did not
cross state lines). Furthermore, courts’ treatments of the next statute, 18 U.S.C. §
875, underscore the point. Section 875 contains no such limiting language, and
courts have held that threatening Internet communications can be prosecuted even
where the defendant and the recipient reside in the same state. See United States v.
Kammersell, 196 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Morales, 272 F.3d 284
(5th Cir. 2001).
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B. 18 U.S.C. § 875
This statute, entitled “Interstate Communications,” contains a
203
provision that in certain cases applies to cyberstalking. Subsection
204
(c) prohibits communication containing a threat. This provision is
infrequently applied, and has garnered only a few convictions of
205
note.
The limitation is that the statute requires a “threat.” The
usual interpretation of a “true,” or “credible threat,” was expressed in
206
United States v. Kelner, where the court held that a threat must be an
“unequivocal, unconditional and specific expression[] of intention
207
immediately to inflict injury.” This high threshold excludes a broad
array of cyberstalking activity that does not convey such a narrowly
208
construed menace.
Unfortunately, at least one court has adopted an even more
209
restrictive standard.
In United States v. Alkhabaz—the case that
affirmed the dismissal of Jake Baker and Arthur Gonda’s indictments
under § 875—the Sixth Circuit announced that to amount to a
“threat,” the communication “must be such that a reasonable person
(1) would take the statement as a serious expression of an intention
to inflict bodily harm (the mens rea), and (2) would perceive such
expression as being communicated to effect some change or achieve
210
some goal through intimidation (the actus reus).”
The dissent in
Alkhabaz took strong issue with the majority’s extrajudicial addition of
211
an element into the statute.
The judge noted that even though
203

18 U.S.C. § 875 (2012).
18 U.S.C. § 875(c).
205
One such conviction came in an aforementioned case, United States v. Rose,
315 F.3d 956, 957 (8th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944 (9th
Cir. 2007) (transmitting interstate threats to injure and transferring social security
numbers of various targets on website); United States v. Newell, 309 F.3d 396 (6th
Cir. 2002) (sending “harassing and threatening” e-mails to ex-girlfriend); United
States v. Scott, 42 F. App’x. 264 (10th Cir. 2002) (sending threatening e-mails);
Morales, 272 F.3d 284 (entering Internet chat room and threatening to shoot and kill
students at school); United States v. Johnson, 18 F. App’x 463 (9th Cir. 2000)
(sending e-mail threats to kill judicial officer); Kammersell, 196 F.3d 1137 (sending a
bomb threat by instant message).
206
534 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1976).
207
Id. at 1027.
208
For an argument that the “credible threat” standard is outdated, see Joanna
Lee Mishler, Cyberstalking: Can Communication via the Internet Constitute a Credible
Threat, and Should an Internet Service Provider be Liable if it Does?, 17 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 115, 121–29 (2000).
209
See United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997).
210
Id. at 1495.
211
Id. at 1506 (Krupansky, J., dissenting).
204
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certain communications under § 875 would satisfy the constitutional
“threat” standard, they would nonetheless be immune from
prosecution because, as here, they “were not made with the intent to
212
realize a specific purpose through intimidation.”
A related problem with § 875 is that its language does not appear
to allow a “course of conduct” to amount to a threat: the menace
213
must be transmitted through one message. Given that much of the
fear generated from cyberstalking is derived from continual contact,
rather than a single isolated threat, this statute’s applicability is
limited. Although § 875 may be useful in certain egregious
situations, it is not valuable in cyberstalking cases where the fear is
supplied by the stalker’s continual contact with the victim, rather
than by the content of the messages themselves.
C. 47 U.S.C. § 223
In 2006, Congress amended this longstanding telephone
214
harassment statute —enacted in 1934—”to ensure that e-mail
215
Today,
messages sent via the Internet were covered by § 223.”
“whoever . . . makes a telephone call or utilizes a telecommunications
device, whether or not conversation or communication ensues,
without disclosing his identity and with intent to annoy, abuse,
threaten, or harass any person” is guilty of sending “obscene or
216
harassing” communications. While this statute has proven useful in
217
the past, several issues render it ineffective.
First, it may be unconstitutional.
The “intent-to-annoy”
218
requirement has posed problems in similar statutes. In Coates v. City
of Cincinnati, for example, the Supreme Court struck down an
ordinance that forbid residents to assemble in groups and comport
219
themselves in an “annoying” manner.
The Court found that the
statute was unconstitutionally vague because conduct that “annoys
220
some people does not annoy others.”
Therefore, “no standard of

212

Id.
18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2006).
214
47 U.S.C. § 223 (2006).
215
Goodno, supra note 26, at 148.
216
47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C) (2006).
217
It was, for example, used to garner a conviction in United States v. Bowker,
372 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 2004), see infra text accompanying notes 225–229.
218
See Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); Bolles v. People, 189
Colo. 394 (1975).
219
402 U.S. at 611.
220
Id. at 614.
213
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221

conduct is specified at all.”
Similarly, in Bolles v. People, the court
struck down a harassment statute that required the intent to “harass,
222
223
annoy, or alarm” on the ground that it was facially overbroad.
According to the court, forbidding annoying and alarming
communications would render illegal discussing “anything that is of
any significance . . . . The First Amendment is made of sterner
224
stuff.”
Only one court has ruled on the constitutionality of the mens
225
rea in § 223. In the aforementioned case of United States v. Bowker,
226
In justifying its defense of the
the Sixth Circuit upheld the law.
statute, the court read together the mens rea requirements to give
227
them similar meanings.
So while “annoy” alone may be
unconstitutionally vague, the court held that when it is associated
with words like “threaten” and “harass,” its meaning can be easily
228
understood. The statutes at issue in Coates and Bolles, however, were
229
not substantially different than the statute at issue in Bowker. Given
this, and considering that the Bowker court is the only court thus far
to address the issue in the context of § 223, it would be rash to
conclude that § 223 passes constitutional muster.
But even granting the provision constitutional satisfaction does
not repair its other, and arguably more substantial, infirmities.
230
Goodno isolates two important problems.
First, the fact that the
231
statute requires the communicator to be anonymous is problematic.
This element, “without reason,” prevents prosecution in cases where
232
the victim knows the stalker. This problem seems especially weighty
given that “[m]ore than fifty-nine percent of female stalking victims
(and thirty percent of male stalking victims) are stalked by an
233
intimate partner[.]”
Second, “the statute applies only to direct
221

Id.
189 Colo. at 395 n.1.
223
Id. at 399.
224
Id. at 398.
225
United States v. Bowker, 372 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 2004).
226
Id.
227
Id. at 382–83.
228
Id.
229
Compare 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2006) (“intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass
any person”), with the statutes at issue in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611,
612 (1971) (“conduct . . . annoying to persons passing by”) and Bolles, 189 Colo. at
395 n.1 (“intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person”).
230
Goodno, supra note 26, at 150.
231
Id.
232
Id.
233
Laura Silverstein, The Double Edged Sword: An Examination of the Global
222
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communications between the stalker and victim, e.g., the statute
would only be triggered when the cyberstalker sends an e-mail
234
Therefore, the statute would apply neither
directly to the victim.”
235
to Jebidiah James Stipe’s “proxy cyberstalking,” nor to William
236
These types of
Lawrence Cassidy’s indirect Twitter harassment.
conduct are increasingly relevant, and that this statute fails to punish
them is a major shortcoming.
In sum, all three federal statutes that are applied to cyberstalking
have deficiencies that render them ineffectual, both individually and
in combination. While the jurisdictional expansiveness of § 875 is
better than its sharply delimited counterpart in § 2261A(2), § 875’s
heightened “threat” threshold precludes its application in swaths of
important cases.
And while § 223’s sprawling mens rea
requirements—that certainly skirt, if not breach, constitutional
limits—expand the potential convictions, its other limitations lessen
its effectiveness, without really broadening the federal government’s
reach.
What is needed, therefore, is comprehensive federal
legislation that will incorporate the best parts of existing federal and
state statutes.
IV. PROPOSAL
Congress has recognized the need for reform in cyberstalking
237
legislation.
Their proposed revisions—specifically with respect to
238
§ 2261A—do not, however, go far enough.
Cyberstalking reform
must also include amendments that broaden the scope of punishable
acts, remove jurisdictional impediments, and, in order to ensure
effective enforcement, provide victims a private cause of action.
First, Congress should amend § 2261A(1) by removing the
requirement that the stalker cross state lines, and require only that a
portion of the cyberstalker’s course of conduct take place online.
Recall that Wyoming’s stalking statute reflected the increasingly

Positioning System, Enhanced 911, and the Internet and Their Relationships to the Lives of
Domestic Violence Victims and Their Abusers, 13 BUFF. WOMEN’S L. J. 97, 120 (2006).
234
Goodno, supra note 26, at 150.
235
Black, supra note 17.
236
Sengupta, supra note 17.
237
See Stalkers Act of 2011, S. 224, 112th Cong. (2011), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c112:S.224.IS:.
238
Amended § 2261A(b)(1) would remove the requirement that the stalker and
victim be in different states where the stalker “uses the mail, any interactive
computer service, or any other facility of interstate or foreign commerce.” Id. By
suggesting this change, Congress appears to have recognized what this Comment
earlier suggested: that the use of the Internet itself satisfies the Commerce Clause.
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common reality that stalkers use the Internet as a tool to facilitate
239
traditional, in-person stalking. In that sense, cyberstalking can be a
240
means, rather than an end. Liam Youens did not use the Internet
as a means of torment, but as a way to collect information about Amy
Lynn Boyer so that he could be a more effective stalker in the
241
physical world.
When stalkers use the Internet as a virtual
alternative to monitoring movements in person, the online pursuit
should be no less culpable than the physical pursuit. The law must
recognize that when stalkers use the Internet, they utilize a facility of
interstate commerce, and, as a result, the requirement that they
physically cross state lines becomes superfluous. It limits the number
of cases that the federal government can pursue, without adding
value. When a portion of the stalker’s course of conduct takes place
online, the law must not also require that the stalker physically cross
state lines.
The amended statute must also explicitly recognize that the
242
“following” of a victim—language that appears in Wyoming’s law —
may occur online, and must be included within the prohibited
“course of conduct.” The current version of § 2261A(2) prohibits the
use of “the mail, any interactive computer service, or any facility of
interstate or foreign commerce to engage in a course of conduct that
243
causes substantial emotional distress to that person[.]” By its terms,
online information gathering about a victim would not be
punishable. It is difficult, for instance, to assert that a victim will have
suffered emotional distress from being pursued online when the
victim is unaware he or she is being pursued. When the online
course of conduct extends beyond covert intelligence gathering into
malicious harassment, then § 2261A(2) clearly kicks in. But when the
only online activity goes unnoticed by the victim, § 2261A(2) appears
not to apply.
244
Returning to the Boyer case underscores this point.
Boyer
239

Wyoming’s statute defined the punishable course of conduct to include any of
the following: “(i) [c]ommunicating, anonymously or otherwise, or causing a
communication with another person by verbal, electronic . . . means in a manner
that harasses; (ii) [f]ollowing a person . . . ; (iii) [p]lacing a person under
surveillance . . . ; (iv) [o]therwise engaging in a course of conduct that harasses
another person.” WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-506 (1977).
240
See Wright, supra note 12.
241
Id. Recall Youens’s own opinion on the matter: “It’s accually [sic] obsene [sic]
what you can find out about a person on the internet.” Id.
242
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-506 (1977).
243
18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2) (2012) (emphasis added).
244
We will ignore, for now, that Youens eventually murdered Boyer. See Wright,
supra note 12.
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never noticed Youens’s Internet activity.
By its own terms,
§ 2261A(2) most likely does not apply, because Youens’s online
course of conduct did not cause his victim substantial emotional
246
distress.
But § 2261A(1) would not apply either, because Youens
did not cross state lines in his physical pursuit of Boyer. Amending
§ 2261A(1) to allow prosecution when the stalker utilizes the
Internet, but does not cross state lines, as well as explicitly
recognizing that mere online information gathering is a part of the
culpable course of conduct, repairs this infirmity.
Next, Congress should amend § 2261A(2) by removing the
requirement that the stalker and victim be in different states. As
previously noted, United States v. MacEwan held that the Internet is a
channel and an instrumentality of interstate commerce; therefore,
the Commerce Clause regulates the transmission of child
pornography over the Internet even if the transmission does not cross
247
state lines.
In so holding, the court analogized the Internet to
other traditional instrumentalities of interstate commerce, such as
248
bridges, railways, and airplanes.
Moreover, MacEwan was not an
isolated holding. In United States v. Extreme Assocs., the court held that
the “Internet is a channel of commerce covered by the federal
249
statutes regulating the distribution of obscenity.”
Therefore, the requirement in § 2261A(2) that the victim be “a
person in another State” is unnecessary when the Internet is involved.
Despite Congress’s initial reticence, it seems to have recognized this
important point of law more recently. Its proposed amendment to
§ 2261A states that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, with intent
to kill, physically injure, harass, or intimidate another person, to
engage in a course of conduct . . . that uses the mail, any interactive
computer service, or any other facility of interstate or foreign
250
commerce[.]”
This amendment is important for two related
reasons. First, it would remove the current requirement that the
251
victim and stalker be in different states.
Second, the language
used—”that uses the mail, any interactive computer service, or any
252
other facility of interstate or foreign commerce” —suggests that
245

Id.
18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(B).
247
445 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2006).
248
Id. at 245 n.8.
249
431 F.3d 150, 161 (3d Cir. 2005).
250
Stalkers Act of 2011, S. 224, 112th Cong. (2011), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c112:S.224.IS:.
251
18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(B).
252
Stalkers Act of 2011, S. 224, 112th Cong. (2011) (emphasis added), available at
246
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Congress considers an interactive computer service a facility of
interstate commerce. Congress should speedily adopt this revision.
Next, Congress should insert a provision similar to one present
253
in Illinois’s law.
As noted above, the law makes it a crime to
“create[] and maintain[] an Internet website or webpage which is
accessible to one or more third parties” that either “communicates a
threat . . . [or] places that person or a family member of that person
in reasonable apprehension of immediate or future bodily harm . . .
or solicits the commission of an act” that would be a violation of
254
Illinois’s code. This type of language appears to cover two types of
conduct: “cyberstalking by proxy,” and conduct like that of William
Lawrence Cassidy, where there is no direct communication between
255
the stalker and victim.
This Comment’s final suggestion returns again to the Boyer case.
After her murder, Boyer’s estate brought suit against Docusearch for
256
providing Youens with the information that led to her killing.
Docusearch argued that it owed no duty to Boyer, and the District
Court for the District of New Hampshire certified the question to the
257
New Hampshire Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court imposed a
258
duty on Docusearch.
In so concluding, the court began with the
general rule that “[a]ll persons have a duty to exercise reasonable
259
care not to subject others to an unreasonable risk of harm.” Duty
does not arise solely from relationships, the court noted, but also
“from the need for protection against reasonably foreseeable
260
harm.”
Generally, however, because “actor[s] may reasonably
proceed upon the assumption that others will obey the law,” criminal
261
misconduct is unforeseeable.
There are three exceptions to this
general rule: (1) where a special relationship exists; (2) where special
circumstances exist; and (3) where the duty has been voluntarily
262
assumed.
There are special circumstances “where there is ‘an
especial temptation and opportunity for criminal misconduct
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c112:S.224.IS:.
253
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/12-7.5 (2011).
254
Id.
255
Sengupta, supra note 17.
256
Remsburg v. Docusearch, No. CIV. 00-211-B, 2002 WL 844403, at *1 (D.N.H.
Apr. 25, 2002).
257
Id.
258
Remsburg v. Docusearch, 816 A.2d 1001, 1006 (N.H. 2003).
259
Id.
260
Id. (citing Hungerford v. Jones, 722 A.2d 478, 480 (N.H. 1998)).
261
Id. (citing Walls v. Oxford Mgmt. Co., 633 A.2d 103, 105 (N.H. 1993)).
262
Id. at 1007.
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263

brought about by the defendant.’”
After all, where one creates a
situation that “involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another,” he
264
or she has a duty to prevent that risk from occurring. regardless of
whether the “exact occurrence or precise injuries” were
265
foreseeable. Critically, the court held that the rise in cyberstalking
266
has created just such a foreseeable risk. Therefore, the court held,
if a data broker like Docusearch’s “disclosure of information to a
client creates a foreseeable risk of criminal misconduct against the
third person whose information was disclosed, the investigator owes a
duty to exercise reasonable care not to subject the third person to an
267
unreasonable risk of harm.”
Congress should follow in the footsteps of the New Hampshire
Supreme Court and include in § 2261A a private cause of action for
victims of cyberstalking against data brokers who have breached a
268
duty of reasonable care to the people whose information they sell.
Incorporating such a remedy would facilitate the government’s goals.
After all, the provision’s very existence would create a disincentive to
data brokers to haphazardly provide private individuals’ sensitive
information to others. By cutting off the dissemination of this private
information at its source, the government should be able to
prevent—rather than punish—cyberstalking.
V. CONCLUSION
When the worlds of crime and technology collide, law
enforcement is always left fighting to keep up. Advances arrive at a
head-spinning rate, and criminals tend to be quick learners. Despite
the government’s best intentions, it has not been able to keep pace
with technological “advancements” in cyberstalking. New ways to
distribute and collect information have supplanted older and
established means, allowing cyberstalkers to skirt the edges of
established law. By necessity, the states and Congress have attacked
the problem in piecemeal fashion, addressing specific problems when
they arise. While these stopgap measures were no doubt justified
when they were first contemplated, the resulting collection of

263

Id. (citing Walls, 663 A.3d at 106).
Remsburg, 816 A.2d at 1007.
265
Id. (citing Iannelli v. Burger King Corp., 761 A.2d 417, 420 (2000)).
266
Id. at 1008.
267
Id. at 1007.
268
For a discussion on the applicability of the tort of intrusion in this context, see
William Dalsen, Comment, Civil Remedies for Invasions of Privacy: A Perspective on
Software Vendors and Intrusion upon Seclusion, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1059 (2009).
264
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divergent approaches created a muddled system of overlapping
obligations. Simplifying the federal government’s approach while
broadening its reach will eliminate confusion and allow the federal
government to pursue a wide range of dangerous criminals.
Adopting these proposed revisions and excising the state approach
should correct some of the current ills, and protect some currently
vulnerable victims.

